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ABSTRACT
State governments contract with health maintenance organizations (HMOs) to coordinate medical
care for nearly 20 million Medicaid recipients. Identifying the causal effect of HMO enrollment on
government spending and health care quality is difficult if, as is often the case, recipients have the option
to enroll in a plan.  To estimate the average effect of HMO enrollment, this paper exploits county-level
mandates introduced during the last several years in the state of California that required most Medicaid
recipients to enroll in a managed care plan.  The empirical results demonstrate that the resulting switch
from fee-for-service to managed care was associated with a substantial increase in government spending
but no observable improvement in health outcomes, thus apparently reducing the efficiency of this large
government program.  The findings cast doubt on the hypothesis that HMO contracting has reduced the









A central issue in public finance concerns the desirability of contracting public services out to the 
private sector.  Advocates of contracting out argue that private firms are more efficient and are more 
likely to offer a range of services that will allow each individual to get closer to her preferred bundle.  
Opponents assert that private firms reduce non-contractible quality and avoid unprofitable clients.  As 
previous researchers have noted, the optimal public-private mix is likely to vary across government 
services, with an easy-to-monitor service like garbage collection a strong candidate for contracting out 
and national defense located at the opposite end of the spectrum (Shleifer, 1998). 
Though the extent of private sector involvement has been growing for a number of government 
services in the U.S., perhaps the most striking recent change has been the increasing role of private 
managed care organizations in the government’s Medicare and Medicaid programs. Rather than directly 
reimbursing hospitals, physicians, and other health care providers, the federal and individual state 
governments now contract with HMOs and similar managed care organizations to coordinate medical 
care for more than one-third of the 75 million beneficiaries of these two programs. In most cases, the 
managed care plans are paid a fixed amount each month per enrollee.  This payment may vary with 
recipient characteristics but typically does not increase if the recipient’s health deteriorates or if she 
receives intensive treatments. 
This shift from fee-for-service to managed care was to some extent motivated by a desire to 
reduce both the level and the growth rate of expenditures in these two public programs.  Taken together, 
Medicare and Medicaid now account for nearly $500 billion in government spending and are projected to 
account for an increasing share of GDP in the U.S. as the population ages.  While these two programs 
provide valuable insurance to two of society’s most vulnerable groups – the elderly and the poor – the 
method of payment that Medicare and Medicaid have historically used introduces significant distortions 
in medical care purchase decisions.  Because the fee-for-service system does not constrain health care 
utilization and program participants only face a fraction of the price of additional medical care, 
individuals are likely to consume some services that provide a benefit substantially below cost.  3
If managed care plans have information about the value that their Medicare and Medicaid 
enrollees are likely to place on particular treatments, they may be well positioned to reduce medical care 
utilization while still providing valuable insurance against adverse health shocks.
1  In the limit, the set of 
marginal services - those covered by fee-for-service but not under managed care - would yield no health 
benefit and thus medical care spending could decline with no change in individuals’ health outcomes 
(though presumably with some decline in their utility).  Depending on the extent of moral hazard in 
medical care purchase decisions, the government could potentially lower public medical spending by 
contracting with organizations that can constrain health care utilization and more accurately measure the 
costs and benefits of particular services. 
There are three additional channels through which HMOs could lower health care spending and 
increase the efficiency of medical care.  First, because their reimbursement does not increase in response 
to changes in the health of their enrollees, managed care organizations will have a financial incentive to 
keep their beneficiaries healthy.  Thus plans may use their superior information about the benefits of 
health care treatments and lifestyle changes to encourage decisions that will lower future demand for 
medical care services.  Additionally, plans may be able to negotiate lower input prices from medical care 
suppliers, with recent work showing that private managed care plans pay lower prices than their private 
fee-for-service counterparts for the same services (Cutler, McClellan, Newhouse, 2000). And finally, if 
the government contracts with from multiple managed care plans, then the resulting competition and the 
increase in the number of options that program participants have may lead to substantial improvements in 
medical care quality.  For these reasons, it is possible that managed care plans can lower public medical 
spending while holding constant or improving health outcomes for beneficiaries of the Medicare and 
Medicaid programs. 
While the set of arguments in favor of contracting with HMOs is extensive, other theoretically 
appealing hypotheses suggest that shifting Medicare and Medicaid recipients to managed care will either 
                                                 
1 See Glied (2000), Miller and Luft (1997), and Cutler, McClellan, and Newhouse (2000) for more detailed 
discussions of the potential effects of managed care.  4
increase government spending or adversely affect health outcomes and thus reduce program efficiency. 
Because each program insures approximately 40 million individuals, the federal and individual state 
governments are likely to have more market power than a typical HMO and may therefore be able to 
negotiate lower prices for medical care.  Additionally, to the extent that there are increasing returns to 
scale in program administration, contracting with multiple plans will increase total administrative costs 
and reduce the fraction of spending devoted to medical care services.  Third, the costs to the government 
will depend not just on the costs to the managed care organization but also on the extent to which plans 
markup their bids when competing for Medicaid HMO contracts. If the bidding process is not particularly 
competitive, then this markup could be substantial.  And finally, because HMOs are reimbursed a fixed 
amount per recipient that depends on a limited set of observable characteristics, they may have an 
incentive to provide a mix of services that discourages some individuals from enrolling. 
It is therefore largely an empirical question whether the shift from fee-for-service to managed 
care has increased the efficiency of these two large government programs.  Medicare is a federally funded 
and administered program in which recipients have the option to enroll in an HMO but are not required to 
do so.  Identifying the effect of managed care enrollment in this program is difficult for two reasons.  
First, because virtually all Medicare recipients can enroll in a managed care plan, it is difficult to reliably 
estimate a causal effect, as those who choose to enroll in a plan are likely to differ in unobservable ways 
from those who do not.  Second, even if one looks at changes in a particular recipient’s spending or health 
outcomes following a switch into or out of managed care, it is plausible that a change in health and thus in 
the demand for medical care services caused the change.   
In contrast to the Medicare program, Medicaid is administered by state governments and there is 
substantial variation across states and localities in the rules that influence Medicaid managed care 
enrollment.  Furthermore, many Medicaid recipients are required to enroll in an HMO.  Thus both of the 
obstacles to identification are less of an issue for this program. 
  In this paper, I estimate the effect of HMO contracting by exploiting twenty county-level 
Medicaid mandates passed in the state of California during the 1990s that required more than 3.5 million  5
Medicaid recipients to enroll in an HMO.  This study represents the first attempt to utilize individual-level 
data to measure both the spending and the health outcome effects of such an ambitious shift in the 
insurance coverage of the Medicaid population.
2  As a result of the mandates, the fraction of program 
participants enrolled in an HMO
3 rose from 14% to 51%.  The number of Medicaid managed care plans 
varied across counties, but in all cases the state government paid HMOs a fixed amount per recipient-
month and the plans then paid health care providers for medical care services.  Recipients continued to 
bear no financial cost for any services covered by Medicaid – both the deductible and the co-pay 
remained at zero.
4 
  My first set of empirical results, which uses county-level data from 1993 to 2000, strongly 
suggests that the shift from fee-for-service to managed care was associated with a significant increase in 
government spending.  Obtaining a reliable point estimate of the effect of HMO enrollment from the 
county-level data is difficult, however, because the groups affected by the mandates accounted for a 
relatively small share of total Medicaid spending.  In most counties, welfare recipients were required to 
enroll in an HMO while the aged, blind, and disabled beneficiaries of the SSI program were not.  While 
most Medicaid recipients are eligible through welfare (TANF / Cal Works), SSI recipients are several 
times more costly on average and account for the majority of program spending. 
I therefore next use individual-level data to estimate the average expenditure effect of switching a 
fee-for-service Medicaid recipient into an HMO.  Using a 5% sample of nearly 300,000 welfare recipients 
                                                 
2 A substantial body of research examines the effect of Medicaid managed care on measures of health care quality 
(see Kaiser (1995) for a review) though few focus on health outcomes.  Recent exceptions include Levinson and 
Ullman (1998) and Kaestner, Dubay, and Kenney (2002), with both studies using infant health as the outcome 
variable of interest.  Notable papers that estimate the effect of Medicaid managed care on government spending 
include Leibowitz, Buchanan, and Mann (1992), Buchanan, Leibowitz, and Keesey (1996), and Goldman, 
Leibowitz, and Buchanan (1998).  All three of these studies have the advantage of random assignment, though each 
one examines just one pilot managed care plan.  The current study considers the effect of nearly 50 HMOs for a 
substantially longer time period and also considers the effect of these plans on health outcomes. 
3 In the discussion that follows, I use the terms HMO and managed care plan interchangeably.  It is worth noting that 
HMOs represent one particular type of managed care, but that other types of insurance would also be classified as 
managed care (e.g. primary care case management, preferred provider organization).  Because all of the 44 plans 
that have contracts in counties with a mandate are most accurately classified as HMOs, I do not distinguish between 
HMOs and other plan types. 
4 See Ellis and McGuire (1993) and Newhouse (1996) for a discussion of the tradeoffs associated with different 
degrees of supply and demand-side cost-sharing.  6
with at least one month of Medicaid eligibility between January of 1993 and December of 1999, my 
findings demonstrate that the average effect of the switch in enrollment induced by the mandates was to 
increase government spending by approximately 12%.  The expenditure effect of the mandate varied 
substantially across counties, with increases of more than 20% occurring in those counties that had 
relatively little pre-mandate managed care penetration and no increase in counties with one-third of their 
Medicaid recipients voluntarily enrolled in an HMO at the time of the mandate.  There are a number of 
possible explanations for this heterogeneous effect, including pre-mandate selection of low-cost 
individuals by HMOs and a correlation between the extent of voluntary HMO enrollment and the 
competitiveness of the bidding process.  I discuss this further below. 
Whether the increase in government spending was associated with an improvement in health 
outcomes is the subject of the third empirical section.  The findings there suggest that switching fee-for-
service Medicaid recipients into HMOs reduced the avoidable hospitalization rate among children by 
approximately 30%. But because similar declines were observed for other conditions unlikely to be 
affected by medical care quality (i.e. accidents), this finding appears not to reflect a real improvement in 
health but instead a change in treatment patterns.  An analysis of infant health outcomes supports this 
conclusion, as infants born in affected counties following the passage of the mandates are no less likely to 
die or to be born at low birth weight. 
Taken together, the results suggest that contracting with HMOs reduced the efficiency of 
California’s Medicaid program.  At a minimum, one can reject the hypothesis that the switch from fee-
for-service to managed care reduced the state government’s spending below what it otherwise would have 
been.  It is obviously unclear whether these results do generalize to other categories of Medicaid 
recipients, to other state Medicaid programs, or to the federal Medicare program.  But given that the 
mandates did mitigate the selection problem and that California’s HMO market is among the most 
competitive in the U.S., the expenditure results described below should give pause to those who believe 
that HMO contracting is the most effective way to control current and future public medical spending.  7
The outline of the paper is as follows.  The second section presents a simple theoretical 
framework for identifying the effect of contracting out a government program. Section three provides 
background on the Medicaid program and on the mandates introduced during the last several years that 
have required most Medicaid recipients to enroll in an HMO.  The fourth section presents both county and 
individual-level analyses that examine the impact that switching Medicaid recipients from the fee-for-
service system to HMOs had on government spending.  In section five I explore whether the growth in 
managed care was associated with a significant change in health outcomes.  The final section concludes 
and discusses whether the findings presented here are likely to generalize to other settings. 
II. Theoretical Framework 
Consider a government program that provides medical insurance to N individuals by reimbursing 
K different types of providers (e.g.. physicians, hospitals, pharmacies, etc.) for the costs associated with 
each individual’s medical care.  Program participants do not bear any share of the costs for either type of 
service.  For simplicity assume that each unit of service provided by a provider of type k is reimbursed at 
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with Xjk equal to the units of medical care consumed by individual j at provider type k and AFFS,N equal to 
the cost to the government of administering the program when there are N fee-for-service recipients.  As 
Pk increases, the average quality of service type k is likely to increase as health care providers compete to 
attract more program participants.  Such an increase may also affect the equilibrium quality of the other 
services and is likely to influence the total amount of each service type consumed by program 
beneficiaries.   For any vector of fee-for-service prices P the health of individual j will be Hj(P), with the 
effect of prices on health potentially varying across individuals. 
  Now suppose that the government is considering contracting out medical care delivery for n of 
the N program participants to a managed care organization.  The government could begin by setting a  8
level of health care quality that a managed care organization must meet or exceed, though there may be 
unobservable or non-contractible versions of quality that would make such a regulation difficult to 
enforce.  Subject to a specific quality constraint, managed care organization M would find it profit-
maximizing to treat all n patients for an average reimbursement per program participant that is greater 
than or equal to a minimum amount RM.  The government could implement this by accepting bids from 
one or more private plans, accepting the lowest bid or the one with a particularly low price for its 
expected level of quality. 
  Because the number of fee-for-service recipients would decline and their average characteristics 
would potentially change, the government might simultaneously choose to adjust the fee-for-service 
vector of prices to P
~
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with AFFS,N-n equal to the costs of administering the smaller fee-for-service program, AMC,n the 
corresponding cost for the managed care program, and R the per-recipient payment to the managed care 
plan.  This equation demonstrates that the change in costs following the shift of n program participants to 
a managed care organization will depend on three factors – the change in costs for the n managed care 
enrollees, the corresponding change for the N-n remaining fee-for-service recipients, and the change in 
total administrative costs AFFS,N-n + AMC,n – AFFS,N.  If the government does not change its fee-for-service 
prices and the supply of medical care services to the N-n fee-for-service participants is unaffected by the 
managed care contract, then only the first and third factors will influence the change in costs. 
The cost to the managed care organization of coordinating medical care for the n program 
participants and ensuring that quality meets or exceeds the required amount will depend on the prices that 
they pay to each provider type and the number of units of each type of service that enrollees consume.  In 
contrast to the government’s role in the fee-for-service system, the managed care organization can  9
directly affect the quantity of medical care consumed by choosing not to authorize services that are 
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with  P ˆ  equal to the vector or prices that the managed care organization pays to health care providers, Zjk 
representing the number of units of type k that are consumed by individual j, and AM,n the costs of 
administering the program.  For three reasons, the managed care plan’s costs of coordinating medical care 
for the n program participants may differ from the corresponding cost for the government.  The most 
obvious reason is that the managed care plan may reduce medical care utilization.  Additionally, plans 
may negotiate prices with the K provider types that are quite different from the government’s fee-for-
service prices.  And finally, the costs of administering the program may also differ across the two types of 
plans.   
One final factor that will influence the expenditure effect of contracting with managed care 
organizations is the difference between the contractual amount R and the average cost (CM / n).  If plans 
mark up their bids substantially above expected average cost, then it may prove to be more costly to 
contract with a managed care organization, even if their costs are equal to or lower than the government’s. 
  The preceding discussion assumes that quality is perfectly observable and that the government 
writes the contract holding the minimum level of health care quality constant.  An alternative and equally 
plausible view would be that the government sets spending and then allows plans to submit bids based on 
quality.  In reality, both spending and quality are jointly set in a typical contract, and some elements of 
quality may not be contractible. Thus one must examine the change in both government spending and 
health outcomes when assessing the desirability of contracting with managed care organizations. 
Ideally, one would trace out the full relationship between spending and health outcomes for both 
fee-for-service and managed care, as it is possible that fee-for-service yields better health outcomes for 
certain levels of spending while managed care is more efficient for others.  Because there is little  10
exogenous variation in spending within either fee-for-service or managed care that would permit a 
reliable estimation of this relationship, the goal of the subsequent empirical work is more modest.  In it, I 
estimate the change in government spending and health outcomes associated with the observed switch 
from fee-for-service to managed care, essentially picking one point on each of the two spending-health 
curves. 
3. Medicaid Managed Care Background and Empirical Framework 
California’s Medicaid program currently provides health insurance to nearly 6.5 million low-
income individuals.  Program participants are a diverse group, including newborn infants, the 
institutionalized elderly, and individuals in dozens of other Medicaid eligibility categories.  Until the early 
1990s, the vast majority of program participants were enrolled in a fee-for-service program, with the state 
of California directly reimbursing hospitals, physicians, pharmacies, and other health care providers for 
the costs associated with their medical care. 
Perhaps because of dissatisfaction with the fee-for-service system, the state of California recently 
shifted to contracting with HMOs to coordinate care for more than half of the state’s Medicaid recipients.  
From 1991 to 1999, the share of Medicaid recipients enrolled in a managed care plan increased from less 
than 12% to more than 51%.  As Table 1 demonstrates, this increase tracked the national increase quite 
closely, with the corresponding figures for the U.S. as a whole standing at 10% in 1991 and 56% in 1999.  
Under this system, HMOs that contract with the state of California to coordinate medical care for 
Medicaid recipients are paid a fixed amount per recipient-month that varies across Medicaid eligibility 
categories. 
While the growth at the state level proceeded quite smoothly during this time period, there was 
substantial variation across local market areas in the pace of managed care penetration.  This variation 
was primarily driven by differences across counties in the timing of Medicaid managed care legislation.  
Beginning with Sacramento in April of 1994 and most recently with Monterey in October of 1999, certain 
categories of Medicaid recipients in the state of California were required to enroll in an HMO.  The  11
groups affected by the mandates and the number of plans from which recipients could choose varied 
substantially across counties. 
A. The Three Models of Medicaid Managed Care 
  There are three approaches that California has employed to shift its Medicaid recipients into 
managed care plans.  In the first, which is referred to as Geographic Managed Care (GMC), the state 
government contracts with several commercial HMOs to coordinate care for Medicaid recipients.  Plans 
initially applied by submitting a menu of prices at which they would be willing to insure each type of 
Medicaid recipient.  The government then awarded contracts to the six or seven plans most likely to 
deliver high quality medical care at a low price, though the weight placed on quality and expenditure was 
not specified. 
The first county to switch its Medicaid recipients to managed care under this model was 
Sacramento, where welfare recipients and several other categories of Medicaid recipients were required to 
enroll in a plan beginning in April of 1994.  Those affected by the mandate accounted for nearly 70% of 
Medicaid recipients but a smaller percentage of program spending.  Aged, blind, and disabled Medicaid 
recipients were not required to join an HMO but had the option to do so, while a small share of recipients 
(i.e. non-resident aliens) were not allowed to enroll in a plan.  At the time of the mandate, approximately 
8% of welfare recipients were voluntarily enrolled in a managed care organization.  This share increased 
steadily during the next several months, but never reached 100% (see Figure 1).  There were three reasons 
for this.  First, it typically took a few months for newly eligible Medicaid recipients to become enrolled in 
a plan.  Second, foster children receiving welfare payments were not required to join a plan.  And third, a 
small percentage of recipients were given waivers from the mandates and allowed to remain in the fee-
for-service system.  Despite this, the increase from less than 10% to more than 80% in just six months 
was quite a significant change. 
  As shown in Figure 2, an even more sharp change in managed care penetration occurred in 
Solano, the first county to switch its recipients into a county-organized health system (COHS) during the  12
time period of interest.
5  Under this model, the not-for-profit, community-based HMO was reimbursed a 
fixed amount per recipient-month that varied by eligibility category.  In contrast to Sacramento, recipients 
did not have a choice of plan in COHS counties.  Additionally, the state government did not accept bids 
from commercial companies, instead deciding in advance to contract with one Medicaid-only HMO in 
each county.  In addition to welfare recipients, the aged, blind, and disabled were required to enroll in the 
managed care plan.
6 
  The final model of Medicaid managed care used in California involved competition between one 
commercial plan and one private not-for-profit, Medicaid-only HMO.  In these “Two-Plan” counties, the 
state solicited bids from private companies and awarded a contract to just one of the plans.  Alameda was 
the first county to switch its Medicaid recipients into managed care plans using this model.  The resulting 
increase in the fraction of recipients enrolled in an HMO was significant (see Figure 3), though a bit less 
rapid than the increase in Sacramento.  Welfare recipients were required to enroll in one of the two plans, 
though the aged, blind, and disabled had the option to join.  Table 3A summarizes how each of the major 
categories of Medicaid recipients was affected in each type of county. 
Table 3B lists the counties that introduced Medicaid managed care mandates during the 1990s 
and the dates that each mandate was imposed.  The final column gives the fraction of Medicaid recipients 
that were voluntarily enrolled in a managed care plan the month before the mandate took effect.  If these 
voluntary HMO enrollees did systematically differ from those in fee-for-service at the time of the 
mandates, then the average effect of the mandate may have varied across counties.  For example, if the 
typical plan selected healthier (low-cost) Medicaid recipients prior to a mandate, then one would, all else 
equal, observe a bigger post-mandate reduction (or smaller increase) in spending in counties with more 
voluntary HMO penetration because pre-mandate spending would be higher in these places. 
  It is theoretically ambiguous which of the three Medicaid managed care models would be more 
likely to yield a favorable change in government spending and health outcomes relative to the fee-for-
                                                 
5 Medicaid recipients in Santa Barbara and San Mateo were required to join a county-organized health system 
starting in 1983 and 1987, respectively.  I select Solano as the first because my data do not begin until 1993. 
6 In most COHS counties, long-term care services are “carved out” of the managed care contracts.  13
service system.  For example, if market power allows the COHS plans to negotiate lower prices from 
health care providers,
7 then one would expect to observe higher spending in GMC counties for the same 
level of quality.  Alternatively, if the competitive bidding process in GMC counties leads plans to mark 
up their bids significantly less than their COHS counterparts, one would find significantly higher 
spending in COHS counties for the same level of quality.  HMOs in Two-Plan counties will have more 
market power than those found in GMC counties, but may benefit less from the bidding process because 
the Medicaid-only HMO is guaranteed a contract and thus insulated from competition.
8 
Three additional points are worth emphasizing.  First, the set of counties chosen for the mandates 
is by no means a representative sample of California’s counties.  Eighteen of the twenty largest counties 
in the state required Medicaid recipients to join an HMO while only three of the smallest thirty-eight 
disproportionately rural counties did.  Part of the reason for this may be that HMOs already had a 
substantial presence in the larger counties but virtually none in the rural areas of the state.  Second, the 
type of managed care chosen in each county was not random.  Sacramento and San Diego were 
designated GMC counties by the state at least partly because the “safety net” providers there were not as 
reliant on Medicaid business as their counterparts in counties like Los Angeles and Riverside.  And 
finally, the timing of the mandates is unlikely to have been strictly exogenous.  It is therefore possible that 
policymakers passed the mandates precisely when health care spending was projected to accelerate or the 
average Medicaid recipient was becoming less healthy.  All three of these issues should be considered 
when interpreting the subsequent empirical results. 
B. Medicaid Spending and Health Outcomes 
Those enrolled in a managed care plan typically have no paid fee-for-service claims.  It is 
therefore not surprising that the increase in managed care enrollment has coincided with a decline in the 
relative importance of fee-for-service payments in the Medicaid program.  In 1989, the $6.8 billion in fee-
                                                 
7 It is worth noting that, even in COHS counties where there is just one plan, the HMOs have less market power than 
does the state Medicaid program because providers often have a presence in more than one county. 
8 I unfortunately do not have data on the number or the characteristics of losing bids in Two-Plan and GMC 
counties.  14
for-service expenditures accounted for 73% of total Medicaid spending (see Table 2).  This fraction 
declined to 53% by 1999 (64% if hospital disproportionate share payments are included), with the 
corresponding shares for capitation payments increasing from 4% to 15%.  The first aim of this paper is to 
determine whether part of the slowdown in Medicaid spending during the last several years (from 16% 
annually in the 1989-93 period to less than 5% per year during the sample period) was caused by the 
increase in HMO enrollment. 
I begin by using annual, county-level data for the 1993 to 2000 time period to investigate whether 
expenditures changed significantly following the shift of Medicaid recipients from fee-for-service to 
managed care plans.  I utilize the passage of a county managed care mandate as an instrumental variable 
to estimate the causal effect of switching Medicaid recipients into an HMO.  The identifying assumption 
of this empirical approach is that the mandate is related to government spending only through its effect on 
plan enrollment. I discuss potential problems with this assumption below.  The baseline empirical 
specifications are as follows: 
kt t k kt kt kt X Mandate ManCare 1 1 1 1 1 1 * ) 4 ( ε λ θ µ γ α + + + + + =  
kt t k kt kt kt X Mandate Spending 2 2 2 2 2 2 * ) 5 ( ε λ θ µ γ α + + + + + =  
with k and t indexing counties and years, respectively.  The IV estimate of the effect of managed care 
enrollment on government spending is simply the ratio γ 2 / γ 1.  
The expenditure data in equation (5) includes county-specific fee-for-service, capitation, and 
disproportionate share hospital payments but exclude the other expenditure categories listed in Table 2, 
which together account for approximately 20% of California’s Medicaid spending.  Two of these 
categories – miscellaneous non fee-for-service and Medicare buy-in – are paid out almost exclusively on 
behalf of aged, blind, and disabled SSI recipients and thus are unlikely to be affected by mandates that 
differentially impacted welfare recipients.  More importantly, these services are “carved out” of most 
managed care contracts for SSI recipients.  Similarly, dental and community mental health services 
(covered by the Short-Doyle program) are also not included in the state’s managed care contracts.  As  15
long as managed care coverage is not affecting payments to these other two types of providers, the 
absence of this data will not be problematic for the county level analysis. 
The lack of data for the costs to the state of administering Medicaid for each county’s Medicaid 
recipients is a cause for some concern.  It is likely that the switch from fee-for-service to managed care 
affected the total cost to the state government of administering the program.  Two opposing forces make 
the sign of this effect ambiguous.  The state no longer disburses fee-for-service payments for most 
Medicaid recipients, but must now contract with and regulate a new set of organizations.  The fact that 
administrative expenses continued to rise by 7% per year from 1993 to 1999 despite a 40% reduction in 
the number of individuals enrolled in the fee-for-service program suggests that the switch to managed 
care did not significantly reduce administrative costs for the state and may actually have increased them.  
Given these opposing forces and the fact that administrative costs account for less than 5% of total 
program spending, it seems unlikely that the absence of this data will have a significant impact on my 
estimates of the expenditure consequences of contracting with managed care organizations. 
I then use a five percent sample of Medicaid recipients to estimate an analogous set of individual-
level regressions.  The California Department of Health Services (DHS) maintains a database that 
contains all fee-for-service payments made on behalf of each Medicaid recipient.  These claims include 
payments to hospitals, long-term care facilities, pharmacies, physicians, and many other types of health 
care providers.  In a typical year, there are more than 150 million fee-for-service claims.  Additionally, 
the DHS tracks each recipient’s eligibility status in every month, and its eligibility file provides data on 
whether a recipient is enrolled in a managed care plan or is instead in the fee-for-service system.  This 
eligibility data can be matched to another DHS data source that contains plan-specific reimbursement 
rates by month and Medicaid eligibility category.  I use this information together with the fee-for-service 
claims to calculate individual-specific Medicaid spending for medical services received by the recipient in  16
each year.  My sample includes information for 634,284 individuals with at least one month of Medicaid 
eligibility between January of 1993 and December of 1999.
9 
There are two important advantages to using this individual-level managed care enrollment and 
expenditure data.  First, it allows me to focus primarily on welfare recipients - the group that was 
differentially affected by the mandates - who are much less expensive than are recipients in other 
Medicaid eligibility categories.  This is shown in the following table, which compares expenditures for 
three different categories of Medicaid recipients in the five percent sample in 1993.  In all of the counties 
that introduced a Medicaid managed care mandate during the time period of interest, individuals eligible 
for welfare payments were required to enroll in an HMO.  Recipients in the second largest major 
eligibility category - aged, blind, and disabled beneficiaries of the SSI program - had the option to join a 
plan but were not required to do so in most counties.  Average costs per month for this group are 
approximately six times greater than for welfare recipients.
10 
Eligibility Category  # Eligible 1993  Avg. Paid 1993  Avg. Months 1993 
All Recipients  332,302  1613  9.4 
Welfare 197,698 718  9.6 
Aged, Blind, Disabled  65,228  4538  10.6 
All Others  69,376  1416  7.5 
Table A: 1993 Medicaid Expenditures by Eligibility Category 
A second advantage of the individual-level data is that the county-level expenditure information was 
calculated by the state Medicaid agency based on the year of payment rather than the year that the service 
was received.  A substantial share of spending in a year is made for services provided in previous years.  
For both reasons the individual-level data will allow me to more reliably isolate the effect of the increase 
in HMO enrollment induced by the mandate.
11  To the extent that the mandates may have affected 
                                                 
9 This implies that nearly 12.7 million Californians were eligible for Medicaid for one or more months during this 
seven-year period. 
10 The two most common group in the “all others” category are OBRA aliens and medically indigent children.  The 
first group was not allowed to enroll in a managed care plan while the second group typically was.   
11 One limitation of the individual-level data is that I do not have person-specific disproportionate share hospital 
payments.  Using the county level data, I test whether the absence of this information is likely to bias my individual-
level estimates of the expenditure effects of HMO contracting and find that it does not have an important effect on 
my county-level coefficient estimates.  17
spending for other eligibility categories (i.e. the aged, blind, and disabled), the focus on welfare recipients 
will not be complete and thus the county-level specifications will have an advantage. 
Once an individual enters a managed care plan, the Medicaid claims data is no longer informative 
about the individual’s health status.  It is therefore not possible to identify the effects of HMO enrollment 
on health care quality without a different source of data.  In my analysis of health outcomes, I utilize 
hospital discharge data.  Though the available data does not allow me to link a specific hospital patient 
with a particular Medicaid recipient, I can investigate whether average health outcomes changed in a 
county or zipcode following the passage of a managed care mandate. The specific outcomes used are 
described in section five below. 
4. The Effect of HMO Enrollment on Medicaid Spending 
In this section, I utilize both county and individual level Medicaid expenditure data to investigate 
whether government spending changed substantially following the shift of Medicaid recipients into 
HMOs.  From January of 1993 to December of 1999, the fraction of Medicaid recipients enrolled in an 
HMO increased from 13% to 51%.  As Figure 4 demonstrates, the increase was even greater for welfare 
recipients, rising from 18% to 76% during the same time period.  Virtually all of this increase was driven 
by the managed care mandates described above. 
There are at least three channels through which HMOs could reduce medical care spending.  
First, managed care plans may reduce resource utilization by authorizing only those services that provide 
an expected benefit that is at or above the expected cost.  Second, the plans may negotiate lower prices 
from medical care providers, with the potential savings depending both on the Medicaid fee schedule that 
was in place at the time of the mandates. And third, the HMO has a financial incentive to keep individuals 
healthy and may therefore encourage cost-effective preventive care and lifestyle changes that will reduce 
the future demand for health care services. 
But there are other reasons to think that contracting with HMOs will lead to an increase in 
government expenditures.  Most managed care organizations have fewer beneficiaries than the Medicaid  18
program and thus may have less market power to negotiate low rates from providers.
12  Additionally, the 
total costs of administering the program may increase as a result of the “partial privatization” of the 
program, with the government still administering a fee-for-service program and now having a new set of 
institutions to regulate.  The HMOs must also pay to administer their Medicaid managed care programs 
and thus the fraction of Medicaid costs devoted to program administration could rise substantially.  And 
finally, the costs to the government will depend not just on the costs to the managed care organization but 
also on the extent to which plans markup their bids when competing for Medicaid business.  If the 
bidding process is not particularly competitive, then this markup could be substantial. 
A. County-Level Expenditure Effects of the Increase in HMO Enrollment 
  To assess whether the introduction of the managed care mandates coincided with a significant 
change in government spending, I begin by running regressions analogous to (4) and (5) at the county 
level.  The specifications in the county level regressions use observations for all 58 California counties in 
each year from 1993 to 2000 and include county and year fixed effects in all cases.  Summary statistics 
for the variables used in this section are included in Table 4C. 
The dependent variable in Table 4A is equal to the fraction of Medicaid eligible months in county 
j in year t in which recipients were enrolled in an HMO.  The explanatory variable % Mandated equals 
the fraction of Medicaid eligible months that were affected by the mandate.
13  This variable will differ 
across counties for three reasons.  First, at a point in time certain counties will have a mandate in effect 
while others will not.  Second, the Medicaid eligibility categories required to join an HMO vary across 
counties.  For example in COHS counties the aged, blind, and disabled are required to join a plan whereas 
in Two-Plan and GMC counties they are not.  And finally, the distribution of Medicaid recipients across 
eligibility categories is not identical across counties.  For example, a Two-Plan county with relatively 
                                                 
12 A number of models predict that price discounts will increase with the market share of the buyer.  See Stoles and 
Zwiebel (1996) for the case of a monopoly supplier and Snyder (1998) for an example with competing suppliers. 
13 Thus if there are 100 Medicaid recipients eligible for the entire year and 70 are required to join an HMO as of 
October 1, the value for % Months Mandated will be 0.7 * 0.25 = 0.175.  19
many SSI recipients as a fraction of its Medicaid population will, all else equal, have a lower value for % 
Mandated than will another Two-Plan county with relatively few SSI recipients. 
 The statistically significant first-stage estimate of 0.563 demonstrates that the mandates induced 
a substantial increase in the share of Medicaid recipients enrolled in an HMO, though the relationship is 
not one-for-one for the reasons mentioned in the third section above.  Including county-specific time 
trends in this regression does not affect the estimate substantially, which falls to 0.507 but remains 
statistically significant at the 1% level.  A comparison of the estimates for the % Aged, Blind, and 
Disabled coefficient in the first two columns suggests that the specification with county time trends may 
be the more reliable one, as SSI recipients are much less likely to be in a managed care plan but the first 
specification suggests the opposite. 
In the third and fourth specifications I interact the % Mandated variable with the fraction of 
Medicaid recipients that were voluntarily enrolled in an HMO in the month before the mandate.  If a 
fraction α  of recipients are in a managed care plan at this time, then the maximum effect of the mandate 
on HMO enrollment is to increase this fraction by 1-α .  As expected, the estimate for the % Mandated * 
Initial coefficient is significantly negative and its inclusion leads to an increase in the estimate for the % 
Mandated coefficient, which rises to 0.78. 
  Using these two variables as instrumental variables for managed care enrollment, I then 
investigate the relationship between the HMO enrollment induced by the mandates and county-level 
Medicaid spending in Table 4B.  The first four columns use total spending per eligible as the dependent 
variable, while the latter four instead use the log of this value.  The first two Spending specifications in 
columns (1) and (2) use only the % Mandated variable as an instrument and yield conflicting estimates 
for the % Managed Care coefficient.  The difference between the two specifications is that the first one 
does not include county time trends while the second one does.  The inclusion of these trends causes the 
estimate to change from small in magnitude and insignificantly negative to significantly positive.  A 
similar pattern is observed for the Log (Spending) specifications in the fifth and sixth columns.  Thus  20
even if one accepts the assumption that the mandates provide plausibly exogenous variation in managed 
care enrollment, it is clearly difficult from this first set of specifications to determine the magnitude or 
even the sign of the expenditure effect. 
  In the next set of specifications, I use both the % Mandated variable and its interaction % 
Mandated * Initial to instrument for HMO enrollment.  The inclusion of this variable allows the average 
effect of the mandates to vary across counties depending on what share of recipients were initially in a 
managed care plan.  If the expenditure effect of HMO enrollment is similar across individuals then one 
would expect to observe a smaller change in spending in counties with relatively many already enrolled 
when the mandate takes effect.  By adding this second instrument, the estimates for the specifications 
with and without county time trends are much closer in magnitude and both are significantly positive.  A 
similar pattern is observed for the analogous Log (Spending) specifications, though only one of the two is 
significant. 
  It therefore appears from this first set of results that the mandates were associated with a 
significant increase in government spending, though the results are not fully conclusive.  It is worth 
noting that this effect, if properly estimated, could be driven by a number of different factors.  For 
example, the state may have paid HMOs more for the groups that were required to enroll.  Alternatively, 
plans may have selected relatively healthy individuals among the groups that were allowed, but not 
required, to join an HMO and thus expenditures may have increased due to imperfect risk adjustment.  It 
is also possible that the state increased provider reimbursement rates to ensure continued access for fee-
for-service participants, who would now represent a smaller share of the market.  And finally, fee-for-
service providers may have increased the intensity with which they treated those remaining in the system 
if managed care plans contracted with new providers and the fee-for-service providers tried to compensate 
for their loss in income.  I focus on the first of these four channels in the next section but all are 
potentially relevant for a reliable estimate of the full expenditure effect of the HMO mandates. 
  One potential concern with this set of specifications is that it includes California counties that 
have never required their Medicaid recipients to enroll in managed care plans.  These areas are smaller,  21
less densely populated places that may not represent appropriate controls for the larger urban counties that 
introduced managed care.  In a separate set of specifications not reported here I show that excluding the 
37 counties without a mandate does not have an important effect on my estimates.  Additionally, because 
my subsequent individual-level analyses do not include hospital disproportionate share payments, I run 
the identical set of county-level specifications excluding these expenditures from the analysis.  The results 
are quite similar to the ones reported here (see Appendix Table 1). 
  In Table 5A I replicate the specifications summarized in Table 4A but differentiate between the 
three types of HMO mandates that were introduced in California.  The first specification suggests that the 
mandates had the sharpest effect on HMO enrollment in those counties that shifted recipients into county-
organized health systems.  This is consistent with the graphs of managed care enrollment in the three 
“pioneer” counties described in section three.  While Solano’s HMO enrollment (in the COHS) increased 
from 1% to 100% in just one month, the increase was slower in both Sacramento (GMC) and Alameda 
(two-plan) counties.  The negative coefficient estimate for the fraction of Medicaid recipients who are 
aged, blind, and disabled has the expected sign and is statistically significant at the 10 percent level.  The 
estimates are not significantly affected by the inclusion of county-specific time trends but all three 
estimates increase when I control for the pre-mandate managed care enrollment. 
  In Tables 5B and 5C I attempt to estimate the difference in the expenditure effect across the three 
different types of counties.  Theoretically, one might expect to observe a heterogeneous effect if the 
number of enrollees affected the plans’ bargaining power with providers, if the difference in competitive 
bidding had an impact on plan markups, if there were increasing returns to scale in program 
administration, or if the possibility that an enrollee would switch to another managed care plan weakened 
the incentive to reduce expected future health care utilization.  Of course given that the model of managed 
care selected for each county was not exogenous one would worry whether any difference was caused by 
this omitted variable rather than by the number of plans.  But given the limited precision of both the 
reduced form and the IV estimates reported in these two tables, it is not possible to accurately measure  22
this difference.  This is perhaps not surprising given that there are relatively few counties in each plan 
type (2 GMC, 7 COHS, 12 Two-Plan) but I return to this issue below using the individual-level data.  
Because the groups required to join an HMO in most counties accounted for a relatively small 
share of Medicaid expenditures, filtering out the signal from the noise in the county-level regressions is 
clearly difficult.  In the section that follows, I use individual-level data and focus on welfare recipients to 
estimate the average effect of HMO enrollment on Medicaid expenditures.  Focusing on the group 
directly affected by the mandate will obviously not provide a complete picture of the true effect, as there 
may be spillover effects and groups allowed but not required to join may experience a change in spending 
because of imperfect risk adjustment or some related factor.  Nevertheless, this will allow me to more 
reliably and precisely estimate the effect of switching a Medicaid recipient from fee-for-service to an 
HMO on government spending.
14 
B. Individual-Level Expenditure Effects of the Increase in HMO Enrollment 
  In each of the 21 counties with a managed care mandate currently in place, welfare recipients are 
required to join an HMO.
15  Table 6A demonstrates that the increase in HMO enrollment among welfare 
recipients in COHS, GMC, and 2-plan counties from 1993 to 1999 has been substantial.  While just 20% 
of welfare recipients in these 21 counties were enrolled in an HMO in January of 1993, more than 85% 
were by December of 1999.  During this same time period, HMO enrollment among welfare recipients in 
the other 37 counties remained at just 1%. 
  In this section, I focus on a sample of individuals who are eligible for Medicaid in at least one 
month between January of 1993 and December of 1999.
16  Additionally, I include in the sample only 
                                                 
14 If, for example, there are spillover effects that cause expenditures for groups supposedly unaffected by the 
mandates to experience significant increases following the passage of the mandates.  See Baker (1997) for an 
example of the spillover effects of Medicare HMOs on treatment and expenditures for fee-for-service recipients. 
15 This group of Medicaid recipients includes 33 Medicaid eligibility categories.  Some of the individuals are not 
receiving welfare payments in each eligibility month.  For example, as a result of the stricter welfare rules enacted 
during the 1990s, the state extended Medicaid benefits for many individuals whose welfare benefits were 
terminated.  Foster children on welfare (approximately 2% of the welfare sample) are only required to join an HMO 
in COHS counties. 
16 Individuals are included in or excluded from the sample based on the last two digits of their social security 
number.  For the 12% of recipients without a valid SSN, the last two digits of the unique Medicaid identifier are 
used.  23
those individuals who are eligible for Medicaid through current or recent welfare receipt (i.e. not SSI, 
Medically Indigent, OBRA alien, etc.) in all of their eligible months during this period.  This sample will 
therefore consist of the group of Medicaid eligible individuals whose HMO enrollment is most likely to 
have been affected by the managed care mandates.  Of the 634,284 individuals with at least one month of 
Medicaid eligibility between 1993 and 1999, my sample includes 302,285 individuals.  Of the remaining 
331,999 people in the five percent sample, 243,074 have exactly zero months of eligibility through TANF 
/ Cal Works while 88,925 have some – but not all – of their Medicaid eligibility months due to welfare 
receipt.  Finally, I exclude 1907 individuals with data inconsistencies across years (i.e. male in 1993 but 
female in 1995) and drop the 21,393 individuals who live in San Diego during one or more months of 
their Medicaid eligibility because I do not have plan reimbursement rates for this county.  I am then left 
with a sample of 278,985 Medicaid recipients. 
  An important feature of the Medicaid program is that spell lengths are often quite short and vary 
substantially across individuals.  Figure 5 shows the distribution of the number of Medicaid eligible 
months in my five percent sample.  More than 25% of the welfare recipients in the sample have 10 or 
fewer months of Medicaid eligibility and more than half have less than 30 months.  There is a “spike” at 
84 months of eligibility – for most of these individuals their spell is both right and left-censored.   
Additionally, some individuals in the sample have a break in eligibility, with 26% having two or more 
distinct spells during the 84 month time period. 
  In the empirical work that follows, I use individual-level data and take a recipient-year as the unit 
of observation to estimate the effect of the managed care mandates on government spending, weighting 
each observation by the number of months that the individual is eligible for Medicaid during the year.  
Because of heterogeneity in the number and duration of Medicaid eligibility spells, the number of 
observations varies across individuals.  This distribution is shown in Table 6B, and my sample has more 
than 1.04 million person-year observations.  
The key identifying assumption of my empirical approach is that the mandates affect Medicaid 
spending only through an impact on HMO enrollment.  This assumption would be violated if, for  24
example, the timing of the mandate in county j were systematically related to changes in spending that 
would have occurred in this county, relative to the rest of the state, in the absence of the mandate.  It is 
not possible to rule out this type of legislative endogeneity, though because the date of each mandate 
varied substantially across counties and was typically chosen far in advance by the state government, this 
seems like a reasonable assumption.  Furthermore, fee-for-service reimbursement rates for many 
providers, including physicians and pharmacies, were set at the state, and not at the provider level.  This 
uniformity across market areas limits the potential for policy-makers in the state government to have 
forecasted when expenditures would increase in a specific county relative to the rest of California. 
The results from specifications that explain the effect of the mandates on managed care 
enrollment are presented in Table 7A.  In each specification, both year and 278,985 individual-specific 
fixed effects are included.  In this set of specifications, the % Mandated variable is equal to the fraction of 
the person’s eligible months in which they are required to be in a managed care plan.  As was true in the 
county level regressions, the mandates are associated with a significant increase in HMO enrollment, and 
the estimated effect increases after controlling for the share of the county’s welfare recipients that were 
enrolled in a managed care plan immediately before the mandate took effect.  Specifications (2) and (4) 
control for the year that the person first appears in the data and interacts this variable with year dummies.  
Individuals initially appearing in 1993 and still eligible six years later may differ substantially from those 
appearing only in 1993 or who are first eligible in 1999.  The inclusion of this set of interactions has 
virtually no impact on the coefficient estimates of interest. 
The dependent variable in Table 7B is equal to total Medicaid expenditures for medical care 
services received by the recipient in the year.   The reduced form specifications presented in the first and 
second columns suggest that the mandates were associated with an increase in government spending.  
According to the estimates from column (2), the average effect of the mandate was significantly lower in 
counties with a large share of recipients already enrolled in a plan.
17  This pre-mandate cost difference 
                                                 
17 The statistically significant point estimates of 138.1 and –399.6 on the % Mandated and % Mandated * Initial 
variables suggest that the average expenditure effect in counties with 35% of their recipients enrolled in an HMO at  25
may have been driven by selection – HMOs attracted individuals healthier than the average and yet were 
reimbursed based on average costs – or simply because the counties initially paid rates to HMOs that 
were above average costs.  Alternatively, counties with high voluntary managed care enrollment may 
have had a more efficient managed care market or experienced a more competitive bidding process for the 
post-mandate Medicaid contracts. 
The results summarized in columns 3 and 4 utilize the % Mandated variable to instrument for the 
share of eligible months that the person is enrolled in an HMO.  The point estimates are positive and 
statistically significant using conventional standard errors, though insignificant after correcting for serial 
correlation in the error term.  Because average spending per year has a mean of $766 in 1999 dollars in 
this sample, the point estimates suggest that the HMO enrollment induced by the mandate is associated 
with a 12-14% increase in government spending. 
In the final two specifications I allow the average expenditure effect of the mandate to vary across 
counties by using both the % Mandated and the % Mandated * Initial variables as instruments for HMO 
enrollment.  If the difference between HMO and fee-for-service costs does not vary significantly across 
counties, then one would expect the average effect of a mandate to differ if some counties initially had 
just 5% of their recipients in a managed care plan while others had 75%, because the predicted increase in 
HMO enrollment in the latter county would be much smaller.  The point estimates for the % Managed 
Care variable increase substantially and suggest that switching a Medicaid recipient from fee-for-service 
to managed care was associated with more than a 20% increase in government spending. 
  In Table 7C I investigate whether the magnitude of the average expenditure effect did vary 
systematically across the different types of managed care mandates.  Because I am missing data for one of 
the two GMC counties (San Diego) I group the other one (Sacramento) with the Two-Plan counties.  The 
final specification summarized in this table suggests that the expenditure effect was not very different in 
COHS and Two-Plan counties, though the point estimate is somewhat larger for the former.  
                                                                                                                                                             
the time of the mandate was close to zero.  Appendix Table 2 shows that Medicaid expenditure increases were 
largest in those counties that were closest to a pure fee-for-service system before the mandate.  26
  It therefore appears that the switch from fee-for-service to managed care has been associated with 
a substantial increase in government spending.  The observed expenditure increase could have been 
driven by a number of different factors, though my data do not allow me to estimate the contribution of 
each factor to the increase.  One plausible explanation is that managed care plans paid providers more 
than they received under Medicaid’s fee-for-service systems.  One of the largest COHS plans pointed out 
in a recent annual report that its physicians “receive 140 percent of the Medicaid fee schedule” (Cal 
Optima, 2000).  Presumably plans must also expect to make a profit in order to willingly participate, and 
thus some of the additional spending may simply be accounted for by HMO net income.
18  Additionally, 
imperfect competition in the bidding process or in the HMO market may have caused plans to mark up 
their bids substantially above cost.
19  And finally, if there are economies of scale in program 
administration, then the state government may have a substantial per-recipient cost advantage as it can 
spread these costs over nearly seven million recipients each year. 
While the results presented in this section cast considerable doubt on the hypothesis that managed 
care is responsible for the slowdown in Medicaid expenditure growth in the nation’s most populous state, 
it says relatively little about the efficiency of the shift.  In the next section, I explore whether the increase 
in HMO enrollment was associated with an observable improvement in health care quality, and then 
assess the efficiency effects of Medicaid HMO contracting. 
5. The Effect of HMO Enrollment on Health Outcomes 
  There are a number of mechanisms through which HMOs could improve medical care quality for 
the poor.  For example, plans have a financial incentive to keep their enrollees healthy to avoid future 
increases in expenditures.  Additionally, HMOs may have better information about the quality of local 
medical care providers than low-income Medicaid recipients do.  Third, competition between multiple 
plans will encourage HMOs to provide high quality medical care to attract potential customers.  And 
finally, plans may use the additional revenues that they receive to give recipients access to better 
                                                 
18 This same COHS plan reported net income of more than $35 million from capitation revenues of $570 million. 
19 This may partially explain why counties with relatively little pre-mandate managed care penetration (and 
presumably less competitive HMO markets) saw the largest increases in government spending.    27
providers than they would have in the fee-for-service system.  Alternatively, short spell lengths on the 
program, incentives to select low cost patients while avoiding expensive ones, and plan dropout could 
reduce the benefits of contracting with HMOs. 
In this section, I investigate whether the growth in HMO enrollment caused by the Medicaid 
managed care mandates led to a net improvement in health outcomes for the poor.  The claims data 
described above have detailed information about each recipient’s health status while in the fee-for-service 
system, but do not have comparable information once an individual enrolls in an HMO.  I thus use a 
different data source that provides similar data for Medicaid recipients whether they are in a managed 
care plan or not.  Specifically, I use hospital discharge data and administrative data on infant health to 
explore whether health outcomes for Medicaid recipients have improved as a result of the increase in 
HMO enrollment.  I am unfortunately unable to link individual-level outcomes data with my Medicaid 
claims information, and therefore must aggregate outcome measures to the zipcode level.
20 
The first measure of health outcomes that I use is the number of avoidable hospitalizations among 
Medicaid-insured children.  Previous studies have defined a set of conditions for which hospital 
admissions among children would fall if the quality of primary care increased (Parker and Schoendorf, 
2000).
21  If managed care organizations provide better medical care than individuals obtain under a fee-
for-service system, then it is plausible that health would improve as a result of this.  Though I am unable 
to measure the amount of primary care that individuals receive, hospital discharge data does allow me to 
test whether an increase in HMO enrollment among Medicaid recipients is associated with a significant 
reduction in the hospitalization rate for avoidable conditions. 
The regression results summarized in Table 8A provide some insight into the importance of the 
shift from fee-for-service to HMOs.  In these regressions, I use the information on zipcode of residence 
                                                 
20 The state of California is currently constructing a data set that will enable researchers to perform this individual-
level link, but it is not yet available and will not cover the pre-mandate period in any of the 21 counties of interest.  
21 The list of conditions includes asthma, pneumonia, other upper airway conditions, gastroenteritis, dehydration, 
cellulites, and seizures. Dafny and Gruber (2002) use a slightly different measure of avoidable hospitalizations, 
which also includes diabetes and iron deficiency anemia.  The most frequent diagnoses (e.g. asthma, pneumonia, 
gastroenteritis) are common to both lists.  28
from the hospital discharge data and from the Medicaid claims data to construct variables at the zipcode-
year level.  The first specification tests whether the HMO enrollment increases induced by the mandates 
are associated with a reduction in the avoidable hospitalization rate among Medicaid-insured children at 
the zipcode level, and account for the fact that the mandates are varying only at the county level when 
calculating the standard errors.  The regressions include zipcode fixed effects to control for time-invariant 
differences across areas in health status or medical care practice patterns and year effects to control for 
average improvements in health among Medicaid recipients. 
The dependent variable in the first column is equal to the log of the number of avoidable 
hospitalizations among Medicaid insured children in the zipcode-year.  This set of conditions includes 
asthma, pneumonia, other upper airway conditions, gastroenteritis, dehydration, cellulitis, and seizures.  
The IV estimate for the % Managed Care variable implies that the switch from fee-for-service to 
managed care induced a statistically significant 30% reduction in the avoidable hospitalization rate among 
Medicaid-insured children, though the precision of this estimate is not particularly high. Alternative 
measures of the dependent variable (i.e. the number of hospitalizations or hospitalizations per Medicaid 
recipient under the age of 15) yield similar results.
22 
This first result suggests that HMOs have improved the health of Medicaid recipients, perhaps by 
investing in preventive care and steering their enrollees to high quality health care providers when the 
return to doing so is substantial.  But it is also consistent with the hypothesis that HMOs choose to 
hospitalize fewer individuals with a particular condition.  I therefore test whether there is a similar decline 
in the hospitalization rate for external causes of injury (i.e. accidents, poisoning, etc.), a set of conditions 
that is unlikely to be affected by managed care organizations.  The significantly negative estimate for the 
% Managed Care coefficient in the third column of Table 8A demonstrates that the decline for this other 
                                                 
22 I include all avoidable hospitalizations (not just Medicaid) among children as the dependent variable in the second 
regression, to ensure that this first result is not simply driven by a “relabelling” effect, as hospitals could mistakenly 
code a Medicaid HMO patient as privately insured rather than Medicaid insured.  The fact that the estimate remains 
negative and falls by approximately 50% suggests that this is not driving the results.  Moreover, it implies that 
avoidable hospitalizations are not trending down among all children in the zipcodes with Medicaid managed care 
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set of conditions has been similarly large, suggesting that the fall in medical care utilization is likely 
attributable to a change in treatment patterns rather than to a real improvement in health. 
  In Table 8B I examine whether infant health outcomes appear to have changed following the 
passage of the HMO mandates by estimating an analogous set of specifications for the fraction of infants 
born at low birth weight and the infant mortality rate.
23  The advantage of this outcome measure is that all 
births occurring in California show up and thus it is easier to separately identify the health effect from the 
change in practice patterns.  One disadvantage with this set of specifications is that I am unable to 
differentiate between Medicaid-insured infants and those with private insurance or without health 
insurance.  If outcomes for these other groups are unaffected by and not systematically related with the 
mandates then this should not bias my findings, though it is important to keep in mind when interpreting 
the results. 
The point estimates for the % Managed Care variable in the odd-numbered columns suggest 
virtually no relationship between the increase in managed care enrollment and the change in infant 
outcomes.  If anything, average infant outcomes have gotten worse following the passage of the 
mandates, as all three point estimates are insignificantly positive. The even-numbered columns investigate 
whether the average change in health outcomes appears to vary across the three types of mandates.  The 
positive and statistically significant point estimates in all three specifications for the % Managed Care * 
GMC County coefficient indicate that infants born in GMC counties have worse outcomes now than they 
did prior to the mandates.  The corresponding estimates for Two-Plan counties are much smaller in 
magnitude but insignificantly positive, while all three estimates for the COHS counties are negative. 
  One possible – but by no means the only - explanation for this pattern of results is that Medicaid 
recipients in GMC counties are less likely to be consistently enrolled in the same plan.  Thus their 
medical care may frequently be disrupted as they switch from one plan to another.  For example, 12% of 
                                                 
23 See Kaestner, Dubay, and Kenney (2001) for an examination of the effect of Medicaid managed care on infant 
health in the U.S. and Levinson and Ullman (1998) for an analysis of the Wisconsin experience.  The results 
reported here are similar to the ones found in both of these studies, suggesting that Medicaid managed care does not 
have a significant impact on newborn outcomes.  30
Medicaid recipients in GMC counties eligible throughout calendar year 1999 who were enrolled in a 
managed care plan in January had switched plans by December.  The corresponding percentages for Two-
Plan and COHS counties were 6% and 0.4%, respectively.  Having a choice between several different 
plans obviously has many potential advantages, but the costs may be greater if it substantially increases 
the ease with which HMOs can encourage unhealthy (and thus unprofitable) patients to leave their plan. 
  While this is by no means an exhaustive set of health outcomes and the aggregation of the data to 
the zipcode-year level prevents me from obtaining very precise coefficient estimates, the results presented 
in this section suggest that HMO contracting has not led to a substantial improvement in the quality of 
medical care received by California’s Medicaid recipients. 
6. Discussion 
During the 1990s, the fraction of Medicaid recipients in the state of California enrolled in HMOs 
increased from less than 12% to more than 51%.  The results presented in this paper demonstrate that the 
increased reliance on HMOs led to a substantial increase in government spending and suggest that health 
outcomes for the poor did not improve significantly.  It therefore appears that requiring millions of 
California’s Medicaid recipients to switch out of the fee-for-service system and enroll in HMOs did not 
lead to an improvement in the efficiency of this government program. 
Do the results for welfare recipients generalize to other Medicaid beneficiaries and to Medicaid 
programs in other states?  Because the mandates differentially affected low cost Medicaid recipients, it is 
certainly possible that the impact for more expensive program participants with a different set of health 
conditions would not be similar.  Additionally, fee-for-service Medicaid reimbursement rates in 
California are lower than those in the typical state.  Thus it is possible that there is a greater chance of 
reducing government spending while simultaneously improving quality by contracting with HMOs in 
other state Medicaid programs. 
But if policy makers chose not to require other Medicaid recipients (e.g. the aged, blind, and 
disabled receiving SSI) to enroll in a plan because they accurately forecasted that the efficiency effects for 
these other groups would be less favorable, then the results presented here provide may understate the  31
extent to which HMO contracting would reduce program efficiency.  Furthermore, because California’s 
HMO market is the most mature in the nation, the managed care organizations in this state are presumably 
more efficient than the typical HMO.  It is therefore ambiguous whether Medicaid HMO contracting 
would be more or less efficient in other states.  
For two reasons, one may expect HMO contracting to be even less effective in the Medicare 
program.  First, because recipients of this program have the option both to enroll in and to drop out of an 
HMO, managed care organizations may find it more profitable to select healthy enrollees (conditional on 
observable characteristics) rather than to improve health.  Second, the extent of demand-side cost sharing 
is much greater for fee-for-service recipients of this program than for their counterparts in Medicaid.  
Thus the fraction of expenditures that have relatively little value to the beneficiary is likely to be lower in 
Medicare. 
  The projected increases in public medical spending along with the deteriorating health of federal 
and state budgets may increase policy maker interest in contracting with HMOs.  The results presented in 
this paper suggest that private managed care plans are unlikely to deliver cost savings to federal and state 
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Table 1: Medicaid Managed Care Penetration Rates 1991-2000 
U.S. Medicaid  California Medicaid   
Year  # Recipients  % Man. Care  # Recipients  % Man. Care 
1991 28.3 9.5% 4.02  11.7% 
1992  30.9 11.8% 4.49 12.5% 
1993  33.4 14.4% 4.83 14.1% 
1994  33.6 23.2% 5.01 16.3% 
1995  33.4 29.4% 5.02 23.5% 
1996  33.2 40.1% 5.11 23.1% 
1997  32.1 47.8% 4.79 38.7% 
1998  30.9 53.6% 4.90 45.8% 
1999  31.9 55.6% 4.97 51.1% 
2000  33.7 55.8% 5.04 50.1% 




Table 2: California Medicaid Expenditures in 1989, 1993, and 1999 
Category of Spending  1988-89  1992-93  1998-1999 
FFS Provider Payments  6820  10195  10526 
Capitation Payments  477  667  2962 
Disproportionate Share Hospital  0  2054  2154 
Miscellaneous non-FFS  94  280  1108 
Administration 297  633  971 
Medicare Buy-In  273  414  827 
Dental 147
* 479  689 
Short-Doyle / Medi-Cal  119  244  614 
Other and Recoveries  -19  9  -80 
Total $8208  $14973  $19769 
Per California State Resident  $281  $480  $601 
Values are in millions of 1999 dollars. 
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Table 3A: Mandates by Plan Type and Medicaid Eligibility Category 
Aid  Category COHS 2-plan GMC 
AFDC / Cal-Works  Mandatory  Mandatory
* Mandatory
* 
Aged, Blind, Disabled  Mandatory  Voluntary
** Voluntary
** 
Medically Indigent Child  Mandatory  Mandatory  Mandatory 
OBRA Alien  Varies  Not eligible  Not eligible 
All Others  Varies  Varies  Varies 
* Excludes foster children        




Table 3B: Type and Date of Managed Care Mandate by County 
County  Type of Mandate  Date of Mandate  Pre-Mandate % MC 
Santa Barbara  COHS  9/83  - 
San Mateo  COHS  12/87  - 
Solano COHS  5/94  1.0% 
Orange COHS  10/95  13.5% 
Santa Cruz  COHS  1/96  0.0% 
Napa COHS 3/98  0.0% 
Monterey COHS  10/99  0.0% 
Sacramento GMC  4/94  6.6% 
San Diego  GMC  7/98  39.3% 
Alameda Two-Plan  1/96  3.3% 
San Joaquin  Two-Plan  2/96  0.7% 
Kern Two-Plan 7/96  0.0% 
San Francisco  Two-Plan  7/96  6.7% 
Riverside Two-Plan  9/96  21.3% 
San Bernardino  Two-Plan  9/96  23.9% 
Santa Clara  Two-Plan  10/96  2.9% 
Fresno Two-Plan  11/96  3.3% 
Contra Costa  Two-Plan  2/97  15.4% 
Stanislaus Two-Plan  2/97  0.0% 
Los Angeles  Two-Plan  4/97  26.8% 
Tulare Two-Plan  2/99  0.0%  38
Table 4A: The Effect of Mandates on Medicaid Managed Care Enrollment 
% Eligible Months in Managed Care   
(1) (2) (3)  (4) 






























# Observations  464  464  464  464 
R-squared .922  .956  .953  .970 
County Trends?  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Sample includes county-year observations for California from 1993 to 2000.  Dependent variable is equal 
to the share of eligible months in which Medicaid recipients are enrolled in a managed care plan.  Robust 
standard errors are included in parentheses, and those reported in brackets are clustered by county to 
control for serial correlation in the error term.  Regressions include county and year fixed effects and are 




Table 4B: IV Estimates of Effect of Managed Care Enrollment on Medicaid Expenditures 
Spending per Eligible  Log (Spending per Eligible)   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
















































#  Observations 464 464 464 464 464 464 464 464 
County  Trends?  No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
DSH  $  included?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
IV used  1  1  1 & 2  1 & 2  1  1  1 & 2  1 & 2 
Sample includes county-year observations for California from 1993 to 2000.  Dependent variable in the 
first four (last four) specifications is equal to (the log of) Medicaid spending (in 2000 dollars) per eligible.  
Specifications in columns 1,2,5,6 use % Mandated as an IV, while those in the remaining four columns 
use both % Mandated and % Mandated * Initial. Robust standard errors are included in parentheses, and 
those reported in brackets are clustered by county to control for serial correlation in the error term.  
Regressions include county and year fixed effects and are weighted by the share of Medicaid eligible 
months in a year accounted for by each county.   39
Table 4C:  Summary Statistics 
 Mean  Std.  Dev. 
% Managed care  .311  .247 
% Mandated  .305  .326 
% Mandated * Initial  .047  .067 
% Aged, Blind, Disabled  .245  .056 
Spending per Eligible  2967  640 
Spending per Eligible (no DSH)  2528  534 
Log (Spending per Eligible)  7.97  .215 
Log (Spending per Eligible (no DSH))  7.82  .198 
% COHS Mandated  .059  .223 
% GMC Mandated  .036  .146 
% 2-Plan Mandated  .210  .282 
% Managed Care * COHS County  .059  .214 
% Managed Care * GMC County  .046  .146 





Table 5A: The Effect of Mandates on Managed Care Enrollment by Type of Plan 
% Eligible Months in Managed Care   
(1) (2) (3)  (4) 




































R-squared .941  .968  .964  .980 
County Trends?  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Sample includes county-year observations for California from 1993 to 2000.  Dependent variable is equal 
to the share of eligible months in which Medicaid recipients are enrolled in a managed care plan.  Robust 
standard errors are included in parentheses, and those reported in brackets are clustered by county to 
control for serial correlation in the error term.  Regressions include county and year fixed effects and are 




Table 5B: Reduced Form Estimates of Effect of Mandates on Medicaid Expenditures 
Spending per Eligible   
(1) (2) (3)  (4) 




































R-squared .955  .984  .960  .984 
County Trends?  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Sample includes county-year observations for California from 1993 to 2000.  Dependent variable is equal 
to Medicaid spending (in 2000 dollars) per eligible.  Robust standard errors are included in parentheses, 
and those reported in brackets are clustered by county to control for serial correlation in the error term.  
Regressions include county and year fixed effects and are weighted by the share of Medicaid eligible 
months in a year accounted for by each county.  
 
 
Table 5C: IV Estimates of Effect of Managed Care Enrollment on Medicaid Expenditures 
Spending per Eligible   
(1) (2) (3)  (4) 






































IV Used  1  1  1 & 2  1 & 2 
County Trends?  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Sample includes county-year observations for California from 1993 to 2000.  Dependent variable is equal 
to Medicaid spending (in 2000 dollars) per eligible.  Specifications in columns 1 and 2 use % Mandated * 
Type of Plan as instrumental variables, while those in columns 3 and 4 also use % Mandated * Initial. 
Robust standard errors are included in parentheses, and those reported in brackets are clustered by county 
to control for serial correlation in the error term.  Regressions include county and year fixed effects and 






Table 6A: Change in Managed Care Penetration Resulting from Mandates 
AFDC  Aged, Blind, Disabled   

































AFDC category includes recipients who are receiving welfare (AFDC / TANF / 
CalWorks, depending on the year) payments or were discontinued from welfare but are 
still eligible because of the Edwards versus Kizer court order.  Some welfare recipients 
are eligible only through the state (and not the federal) program.  Aged, Blind, and 
Disabled group primarily consists of beneficiaries of the SSI program.  Detailed data on 







Table 6B: # of Observations for Welfare Recipients in the Sample 
# Years  # Recipients  % of Total 
1 60540  21.7% 
2 51356  18.4% 
3 35312  12.7% 
4 26657  9.6% 
5 23951  8.6% 
6 19452  7.0% 
7 61717  22.1% 
Number of observations for individuals in the AFDC sample.  #Years=t 
row provides the number of individuals who have t years with at least 
one month of Medicaid eligibility as a welfare recipient from 1993-1999.  42
 
Table 7A: The Effect of Mandates on Managed Care Enrollment Using Individual-Level Data 
% Eligible Months in Managed Care   
(1) (2) (3) (4) 






























# Observations  1,044,302  1,044,302  1,044,302  1,044,302 
R-squared .758  .762  .775  .779 
Person & Year Effects?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Entry * Year Interactions?  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Dependent variable is equal to the fraction of Medicaid eligible months in which the recipient is enrolled 
in a managed care plan. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by county*year, while those reported 
in brackets are clustered by county to account for serial correlation in the error term. Regressions are 
weighted by the number of eligible months for the individual in the year. 
 
 
Table 7B: Effect of Managed Care Enrollment on Medicaid Spending Using Individual-Level Data 
Medicaid Spending for Individual j in Year t   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 


















    
% Mandated * Initial    -399.6 
(74.7) 
[48.5] 
    


















#  Observations  1,044,302 1,044,302 1,044,302 1,044,302 1,044,302 1,044,302 
R-squared .497  .497  - - - - 
Person & Year Effects?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Yr Entry * Yr Interact?  No  No  No  Yes  No  Yes 
IV Used  -  -  1  1  1 & 2  1 & 2 
Dependent variable is equal to total Medicaid expenditures for the individual in the year.  Standard errors 
in parentheses are clustered by county*year, while those reported in brackets are clustered by county to 
account for serial correlation in the error term. Regressions are weighted by the number of eligible 
months for the individual in the year. 
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 Table 7C: Effect of Mandates on Managed Care Enrollment and Individual Medicaid Spending 
% Managed Care  Medicaid Spending for Individual j in Year t   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
% Managed Care in 
COHS Counties 






% Managed Care in  
2-Plan, GMC Counties 



























































#  Observations  1,044,302 1,044,302 1,044,302 1,044,302 1,044,302 1,044,302 
R-squared  .767 .782 .497 .497  -  - 
Person & Year Effects?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Yr Entry * Yr Interact?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
IV Used  -  -  -  -  1  1 & 2 
Dependent variable is equal to Medicaid expenditures for the individual in the year.  Standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered by county*year, while those reported in brackets are clustered by county to 
account for serial correlation in the error term. Regressions are weighted by the number of eligible 




Table 7D: Summary Statistics for Individual-Level Regressions 
 Mean  Std.  Dev. 
Medicaid Spending  766  2534 
% Managed Care  .360  .444 
% Mandated  .392  .468 
% Mandated * Initial  .085  .141 
Eligible Months  9.8  3.5 
% COHS Mandated  .053  .299 
% Two-Plan, GMC Mandated  .339  .455 
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Table 8A: IV Estimates of Effect of Managed Care Enrollment on Child Hospitalizations 
Log (Avoidable Hospitalizations)  Log (Accidents & Adverse Effects)   
Medicaid All Medicaid All 
































# Observations  8662  10588  7794  10057 
Year and Zipcode Effects?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Sample consists of zipcode-year observations for 1993-1999.  Dependent variable in the first specification 
is equal to the log of the number of Medicaid insured children admitted to the hospital with an avoidable 
condition.  The dependent variable in the third specification is equal to the log of the number of 
hospitalizations among children with external causes of injury.  Standard errors are reported in brackets 
and are clustered by county to account for serial correlation in the error term.  Regressions include 






Table 8B: IV Estimates of Effect of Managed Care Enrollment on Infant Health Outcomes 
Fraction LBW  Fraction Very LBW  Infant Mortality Rate   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 























































#  Observations  11833 11833 11833 11833 11833 11833 
Year and Zip Effects?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Sample consists of zipcode-year observations for 1993-1999.  Standard errors are reported in brackets and 
are clustered by county to account for serial correlation in the error term.  Regressions include zipcode 
and year fixed effects and are weighted by the number of Medicaid eligible children.  45
 
Table 8C: Summary Statistics 
Table 8A  Mean  Std. Dev.  Table 8B  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Log (MC Avoidable)  3.50  1.16  % Infants Black  .093  .121 
Log (All Avoidable)  4.13  1.01  % Infants Hispanic  .515  .256 
Log (MC External)  2.76  1.04  % Man Care  .313  .256 
Log (All External)  3.45  0.90  % Man Care * GMC  .051  .163 
Log (MC Eligible)  7.65  1.10  % Man Care * COHS  .048  .180 
% Hispanic  .509  .256  % Man Care * Two-Plan  .212  .234 
% Black  .146  .162  % LBW  .064  .020 
     %  VLBW  .012  .008 
     Infant  Mortality  .0066  .0049  46
Appendix Table 1: 
IV Estimates of Effect of Managed Care Enrollment on Medicaid Expenditures 
Spending per Eligible  Log(Spending per Eligible)   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
















































#  Observations  464 464 464 464 464 464 464 464 
County  Trends?  No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
DSH  $  included?  No No No No No No No No 
IV used  1  1  1 & 2  1 & 2  1  1  1 & 2  1 & 2 
Sample includes county-year observations for California from 1993 to 2000 and, in contrast to Table 4B, 
excludes county-specific disproportionate share hospital payments. Dependent variable in the first four 
(last four) specifications is equal to (the log of) Medicaid spending (in 2000 dollars) per eligible.   
Specifications in columns 1,2,5,6 use % Mandated as an IV, while those in the remaining four columns 
use both % Mandated and % Mandated * Initial. Robust standard errors are included in parentheses, and 
those reported in brackets are clustered by county to control for serial correlation in the error term.  
Regressions include county and year fixed effects and are weighted by the share of Medicaid eligible 





Appendix Table 2: Rates Paid to Commercial Plans in Two-Plan Counties 
County  % HMO Pre  Avg. Paid 95  Rate 1999  ∆ P 
Los Angeles  40.2%  81.21  77.75  -4% 
San Bernardino  31.0%  75.78  74.04  -2% 
Riverside 30.5% 67.49  75.91  +12% 
Contra Costa  22.1%  74.20  78.77  +6% 
San Francisco  13.2%  68.65  90.56  +32% 
Fresno 5.2%  60.41 75.14  +24% 
Alameda 4.7% 60.37  80.30 +33% 
Santa Clara  4.4%  61.00  89.09  +46% 
San Joaquin  0.9%  51.48  71.14  +38% 
Kern 0.0%  64.50  89.09  +23% 
Stanislaus 0.0%  53.50  69.95  +31% 
Table includes information for two-plan counties.  Second column is the percentage of Medicaid 
recipients eligible through welfare receipt enrolled in a managed care organization in the month before 
the mandate. Third column is equal to average monthly expenditures for Medicaid recipients on welfare 
in 1995 in 1999 dollars.  Fourth column is the monthly rate paid to the commercial HMO in January of 
1999.  Final column equals the percentage increase from the average paid amount in 1995 to the 
commercial rate paid in 1999. 
 
 
 